Pushing all the right buttons

Mali’s strongman is a skillful communicator

Mural on a Bamako business depicting Capt. Sanogo; the text reads, “Mali cannot be divided / Mali is one and indivisible / A Mali without corruption, a landmark for youth”

Since the coup d’état six weeks ago, Malians at home and abroad have been desperate to gauge the character and motivations of the men who carried it out. Starting in the early morning of March 22, they have closely followed media appearances by the leaders of the Comité National pour le Redressement de la Démocratie et la Restauration de l’Etat (CNRDRE), in particular its president, Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo. Although he rarely leaves his headquarters at the Kati army garrison — out of concern for his security, we hear — he has often spoken on Malian television and radio, and sometimes on international media outlets.

Although officially he’s no longer in charge, having agreed to hand over power to constitutionally designated civilian authorities a month ago, Sanogo and his junta obviously retain a great deal of power, and Sanogo himself has consistently maintained that the April 6 “accord-cadre” signed between the CNRDRE and regional body ECOWAS guarantees the junta an enduring, if ill-defined, role in Mali’s political transition process. Many Bamakois see Sanogo as the man truly in command of the country and its security apparatus; it’s no coincidence that journalists clamor for his attention.

On Sunday evening, May 6, Africable TV broadcast a recently recorded interview of Captain Sanogo conducted by one of its editors, Abdoulaye Barry, in Sanogo’s Kati office. Previously I had little respect for Barry, whose commentary on the death of Muammar Gaddafi last October was so fawning over the late Libyan dictator it could have been written by Gaddafi’s own propaganda machine. Interviewing Sanogo, however, Barry earned his journalistic credentials through direct, hard-hitting questions. (Info Matin has compiled a transcript in French, slightly abridged in spots.) In the course of this 50-minute interview, conducted in French, it became clear that Sanogo is not only politically savvy but an effective communicator who knows how to reach an audience and push the right buttons.

There are many revealing moments in this interview. Sanogo says his top priority is “the North” (i.e., reunifying the country), a statement he repeats a few minutes later; this is exactly what most Malians, impatient with the state’s inaction in the face of the country’s de facto partition, want to hear. Sanogo says he abides by the accord-cadre and is fully subordinate to Mali’s new civilian government; this is exactly what Mali’s neighbors and donors, anxious to prevent the junta from setting a dangerous precedent, want to hear. Whether Sanogo’s intentions will match his statements is another matter. What I want to focus on here, however, is an exchange that begins 37 minutes into the interview, when Sanogo tries both to justify the coup d’état and to show that he respects democracy far more than the elected leaders he helped topple. The following is my own translation.

Barry: In Africa, where our democracies are often characterized by unlimited terms of office, Mali set a good example. Now Malians hang their heads abroad, because they’re like any other Africans again. They’re no longer proud, they’re ashamed because their country that had been an example has fallen. Do you feel any remorse when you think that ultimately you’re responsible for their shame?

Sanogo: I tell you, it’s now that Malians should hold their heads high. It’s now that Malians should be proud, because [their] democracy was only a shell. A democracy cannot happen without a strong, republican army, and we didn’t have one…. There cannot be democracy with… corrupt, rotten leaders, a hierarchy, I don’t know, without ideas, without motivations citoyennes, because when at a high level of responsibility in the state, you allow yourself to look a citizen in the eyes and lie to him, when you allow yourself to rig elections, when you allow yourself to buy off elections, when you allow yourself to buy off his conscience and lead him where he shouldn’t go, is that what you call democracy? No.

Still image from Africable interview showing Sanogo’s office; note AK-47 sticking out next to portrait

It’s now that Mali can lift up its head a little, it’s now that Mali has regained its pride a little. Because [Malians] have the opportunity again to sit down, make adjustments, and elect whom they want based on principle, not money. To elect whom they want according to their reputation or their power. This means no Malian is all-powerful. A Malian is a Malian. Offering the same chance, the same opportunity to everyone at every level, that’s what I call democracy, and not the other democracy, where a head of state steals, loots, defrauds, betrays his country, is that democracy? … When a government in place doesn’t really serve the mission it should for its country, to save the people, is that a democracy? When elected officials are ready to put everything to work — money, weapons, plots — to achieve their personal goals, is that a democracy? I would say no, but  now the people have the chance to restore this democracy.

Barry: Captain, whatever the limits and weaknesses of Malian democracy, of the Malian democratic project, it remains an example in Africa. We’ve seen what’s happened on the continent, leaders who don’t even have respect for their own people. The former Malian president, whatever one accuses him of, was among the first Africans to take power by force and then respect his people, organize democratic elections and step down, then return ten years later to office by democratic means…. in the name of democracy, one should have instead consolidated that project.

Sanogo: What proves to you that he was going to step down [after elections this year]?

Barry: Well, he said it, we could take him at his word.

Sanogo: He said it, and I think this was the same head of state who said in 1991 that he had no ambition to return [to power]. He came a second time to rig everything, the people know all about it. In short, there was no democracy. The people are a witness. There was none. And this fellow was not going to step down…. History will judge.

Barry: But we were a month from the presidential election–

Sanogo: Just like we were a month from scandal in Bamako, from another civil war, because of this same fellow. I tell you, history will remember this one day.

Barry: Didn’t your coup send Mali back 20 years?

Sanogo: I think the coup brought Mali forward 20 years. Through this coup, the average citizen has seen and understood what he hadn’t understood, has seen what he hadn’t had the opportunity to see, to know what was being hidden from him about his own country, in the same of what democracy?

Here Sanogo masterfully changes the narrative. By his telling, it is not he who undermined democracy by ousting an elected government. In fact, it is he who rescued true democracy from the clutches of a corrupt clique of power-hungry elitists who would stop at nothing to subvert the will of the people. It was not he who upended the institutional foundations of the state (e.g., elections); in fact, he acted to restore institutions already fatally weakened by irresponsible politicians. He did not instigate the political violence that has befallen Bamako since the coup; in fact, he headed off an even bigger threat — a looming “civil war.”

Whatever you think of Sanogo’s narrative, it is a compelling one for a large cross-section of people in Bamako disappointed with their government’s failures over the last several years. In a future post I hope to engage with the classe politique-as-vampire-squid notion that has become so widespread here since the coup. These narratives have caught on for good reason, but they also do not tell the whole truth.

Whether Sanogo sincerely believes these narratives is an open question, and an important one. Whether he sincerely desires to give up power is another: he shows growing signs of self-importance (third-person references to himself, his very presidential-looking framed portrait, his insistence on his men calling him “Président“).

For now, though, one thing we can say with certainty is that the captain is extremely effective in delivering these narratives, adapting them to fit the situation, and ultimately reframing the terms of Mali’s political debate.

[Postscript: A not-quite-complete transcript of the original interview has appeared in the newspaper Info Matin.]

Au revoir Sarko

What if you were to take an opinion poll in Bamako (a purely hypothetical case — such things almost never happen) and ask, “Which world leader do you hate most?” I’m quite certain Nicolas Sarkozy would top the list. This is a town where it’s possible to hear people express favorable opinions about everyone from Saddam Hussein to Muammar Gaddafi to Robert Mugabe and even, occasionally, George W. Bush. But I literally have never met a Bamakois with a kind word to say about Sarkozy.

Sarko & ATT: No winners here

Even before becoming France’s president in 2007, Sarkozy was a despised figure here. As interior minister under Jacques Chirac, he took a hard anti-immigration line, increasing the number of deportations of undocumented migrants and pressuring the Malian government to stem the flow of its citizens to France. No sooner was he elected president than he gave a now-infamous speech in Dakar stating, among other things, that colonialism wasn’t all bad and suggesting that Africans’ marginalization in the present world order has been largely their own fault. The African, Sarkozy claimed, “never launched himself towards the future. The idea never came to him to get out of this repetition and to invent his own destiny.”

His rating among Malians only fell from there, and seemed to plunge ever deeper as Mali’s own fortunes fell. A good many people here see the sinister hand of Sarkozy behind the resurgence of the Tuareg-led rebellion earlier this year. It’s certainly true that the Tuareg have a sympathetic following among the French and that rebel spokesmen have frequently appeared in the French media. It’s also true that, through his support for NATO’s campaign to oust Gaddafi last year, Sarkozy helped bring about certain side effects such as the return of heavily armed Tuareg fighters to Mali. And there may well be French interest in certain natural resources that might someday be exploited in northern Mali.

The notion that Sarkozy has been actively destabilizing Mali became so widespread here that France’s ambassador here had to write an open letter denying allegations of a French conspiracy against the country. In some of the more nuanced versions of this conspiracy theory, such as the one articulated by altermondialiste Aminata Dramane Traoré, Sarkozy is just a prominent cog in a global imperialist machine seeking to oppress the African continent. In other versions, he has singlehandedly spearheaded a campaign to bring Mali to its knees. One thing most Malians agree on is that Sarkozy has been “the worst president in the history of modern France.”

This evening it was announced that President Sarkozy narrowly lost his reelection bid to Socialist candidate François Hollande. People in Bamako now wonder, with a new resident soon to occupy the Elysée (France’s presidential palace), what will change for relations between Mali and France? Will “Françafrique,” the web of “incestuous relations” between top politicians of France and former French colonies in Africa that has existed since the 1960s, finally be dismantled?

Hollande has promised to do dismantle it, but then again, so have many of his predecessors. As Malian editorialist Adam Thiam recently wrote, “men change in the Elysée but France’s policy in Africa endures.”

Update for Friday, 4 May

Briefs

18:30 GMT: The city was calm throughout the day and I haven’t heard shots for a couple of days now. The Bamako airport has reopened and some outbound flights managed to depart on Thursday. A team of Nigerian footballers who got stuck here when the airport closed is looking forward to going home, having been visited at their hotel yesterday morning by heavily armed Malian troops, no doubt on the hunt for those infamous mercenaries at large.

According to media reports, life in Bamako has been gradually returning to normal since Thursday. One report on RFI describes the resumption of daily routines. And there have been some positive signs on the diplomatic front, as ECOWAS seems to be taking a more productive, less bellicose stance toward Mali’s junta; at a summit in Dakar yesterday that included Mali’s interim president and prime minister, the regional body affirmed that it would not send troops to Mali without the request of the Malian government.

ORTM continues to broadcast mostly pre-recorded programming (i.e., recorded years ago), TM2 has been completely off air since Tuesday morning, and apparently the area around the ORTM compound in Bozola has been completely sealed off by the army. I haven’t seen a journal télévisé since the “counter-coup” on Monday, only occasional “flash infos” like the one below showing Captain Sanogo visiting his troops in Kati who were wounded in the fighting this week.

You can also watch an extended “flash infos” from Thursday, May 3, which at the ten-minute mark includes video (without audio) of a visit by U.S. Ambassador to Mali Mary Beth Leonard to Interim President Dioncouna Traoré at the Koulouba presidential palace on Monday, just hours before the “counter-coup” began. It’s worth noting that, unlike many of her counterparts in Bamako, Ambassador Leonard has made a point of not going to visit CNRDRE junta leader Captain Amadou Sanogo in Kati.

[Postscript, Saturday morning, May 5: There has been, however, at least one ORTM evening news broadcast this week, airing at 21:00 GMT on Friday May 4. Topics covered included: the ECOWAS summit in Dakar and the Malian government spokesman's reaction to it; a request to all members of the army's airborne regiment -- i.e., red berets -- to visit a "welcome center" at a Bamako gendarmerie to be counted and "physically checked" before May 10; prayers for peace in Bamako and Mopti; the decision to reopen schools and universities (closed since Tuesday) on Monday May 7; union messages to Mali's workers; World Press Freedom Day. The newscaster wraps up saying "ORTM suffered no loss of life during the events of the beginning of this week."]

Do try this at home

Following my last post on Wednesday afternoon, in which I shared some observations from a trip downtown, I was reminded that the U.S. Embassy’s advice to American citizens in Bamako is to continue to “shelter in place” — i.e., stay home. So for the benefit of readers in Bamako, even if you haven’t received an SMS alert from the embassy for a few days, don’t assume it is safe to go out. As the embassy’s latest emergency message reads, the SMS alert system “does not have a 100% success rate due to the volume of calls currently moving through the Malian cell phone network.” And you can check the embassy website for new emergency messages.

So, until advised to do otherwise, we are sheltering in place, or “sipping” as we Yanks like to say. This term comes up a great deal in conversation lately among American expats in Bamako, as you can see from the sample dialogues I have reconstructed below:

• Fred: “Say, Barney, I thought I’d call ’cause I haven’t seen ya lately. What ya been up to?”
• Barney: “Just sipping.”
• Fred: “Yeah? Me too.”

• Children: “Hey dad, what are we doing today?”
• Father: “Sipping.”
• Children: “Sipping again? Yay!”

You get the picture. Sipping presents many opportunities for fun. If you have electricity, you can watch television, digital video discs, or maybe even surf the information superhighway and obsess about current events. If the power’s out, as it was for a good chunk of today in our neighborhood, you can entertain the kids with games of hide and seek, or fill up wash basins in the courtyard for them to cool off in. (Today’s high: 106 degrees F, 41 degrees C.)

Sip safely, everyone!

Fears, foreigners, and falsehoods

Although the day started out on a note of calm routine, the climate in Bamako has been tense since late morning, for reasons that remain unclear. As with previous days of unrest, our first warning sign came from our son’s daycare staff: around 11:40 this morning, they phoned to tell us they’d be closing early due to “troubles in town.” (At least we got him out of the house for 3 hours today.)

When the call came I was in a taxi near the Ecole Normale Superieure (in Quartier du Fleuve), where a normally two-way street had suddenly and quite spontaneously become one-way east-bound, with both lanes moving in the same direction, albeit slowly due to heavy congestion. I heard a few shots fired near the Central Bank tower but couldn’t see where they’d come from or what caused them.

In the neighborhoods my taxi traversed, offices and many businesses (especially banks and gas stations) closed early, and a steady stream of traffic moved away from downtown. I took the precaution of phoning ahead to the various people I had to visit — in Cité du Niger, the central artisanat (artisans’ market) in Bagadadji, and the Dibida market. In each case the situation was calm. The west side of the artisanat, one of my favorite people-watching spots in town, was thick with Bamakois coming and going; there was no sign of panic or tension, despite the artisanat‘s proximity to the National Assembly, a perennial hot spot for demonstrations. When I asked what had happened downtown and why so many businesses had closed, nobody could tell me. But everyone had heard that some shapeless trouble was brewing.

This cryptic billboard has begun popping up all over town recently. Can someone identify what the letters C.A.V. (upper left) stand for?

By the time I got to Dibida around 2 p.m., many of the businesses in Dibida were also closed or about to close up early. My friend there told me that the shooting I’d heard in Quartier du Fleuve before noon was related to a foreign mercenary who had been killed.

For the last two days, the foreign mercenary has become a bogeyman in Bamako. It was late Monday night that Captain Amadou Sanogo, leader of Mali’s CNRDRE military junta, blamed the unrest that had started several hours earlier on foreign mercenaries who had infiltrated the city in the service of ill-intentioned, unidentified Malians. The junta’s statement on ORTM television Tuesday morning repeated these allegations, adding that some foreigners had been captured alongside the Malian paratroopers who had attacked junta strongholds Monday evening.

Suddenly Bamakois began seeing foreign mercenaries lurking in every corner. These mercenaries most commonly are said to be from Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire.

Do these mercenaries really exist, though? I have yet to see any proof that they do. It’s certainly in Captain Sanogo’s interest to frame the current conflict as pitting Malians against outsiders, rather than pitting pro-putsch Malians against anti-putsch Malians. He knows it’s easy to manipulate fears of foreigners in a context of instability.

Although Mali is regarded as welcoming toward outsiders — rightly so, in my view — Malians are not immune to the temptation to demonize foreigners, especially foreign Africans, for the flimsiest of reasons. Bamako has seen periodic waves of hysteria around alleged “penis shrinkers” (when they touch you, your penis disappears!); as Jean-Jacques Mandel observed a few years ago, those accused are usually Hausa men from Niger. English-speaking Africans (Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Nigerians) are frequently suspected of being con artists and thieves. In 2009 and 2010 it was men from Guinea who were most often suspected of criminal activity in Bamako.

Last week the West African regional body ECOWAS took a firm stance (and an unproductive one, I argue) against Mali’s junta, and vowed to send troops to secure Mali’s civilian transitional authorities. The tough ECOWAS position gave Captain Sanogo a convenient hook on which to hang his accusations of outside meddling in Malian affairs. The current ECOWAS chairman, Ivoirian President Alassane Dramane Ouattara, has been leading the anti-junta push, while Burkina Faso’s President Blaise Compaoré has been overseeing ECOWAS negotiations with Malian civilian and military representatives. On Monday there were rumors that ECOWAS troops had crossed into Mali’s Sikasso region — which borders on Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire — and were heading to Bamako. These rumors were false. Is it a coincidence that now the “mercenaries” in Bamako are alleged to be from Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, whose governments have suddenly become unpopular here?

Shortly before 18:00 GMT this evening, Mali’s transitional prime minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra addressed the nation on ORTM, his first such address since the fighting began Monday. He talked first in Bamanan, then in French; his spoken Bamanan is eloquent, which is one thing you could never say about ousted president Amadou Toumani Touré. Diarra spoke of an “attempt to destabilize” the country, and said that Mali’s security forces had achieved an “incomplete victory” against these destabilizing forces. He never mentioned foreigners or mercenaries, and he went out of his way to quell certain rumors: no, he said, the AEEM secretary general, wounded Monday, is not dead; no, the CNRDRE is not distributing guns to civilians; no, troops have not occupied the bridges; no, the Bamako airport is not closed. (That last came as a surprise to me, as I’ve heard from several sources that the airport was closed until May 7. Apparently it’s reopened.) Diarra called on people to remain calm, to get back to work, and not to listen to rumors.

To my mind, the foreign mercenary story is just another of these unfounded rumors until we have evidence to the contrary.

Update, 7:00 a.m. GMT, Thursday May 3: Revised estimates I’ve seen of the death toll from this week’s fighting now range between 22 and 150, with some indications that it may yet go higher.  Junta spokesmen are using the foreign mercenary angle to describe the battle that ended Tuesday as well as the ongoing “mopping up” operations both in and around the city. Eliminating mercenaries sounds better to Malian ears than eliminating red-beret paracommandos,  since the latter had been held in high esteem here; just a week ago, they were considered the heroes of the republic, the elite shock troops who would defeat the Tuareg rebels and restore dignity to the nation. Now they’re being hunted down like vermin.

Anything that happens can become fodder for mercenary hysteria. The crash of a small plane flying from Nouakchott to Bamako, piloted by a Frenchman, has been interpreted by some as evidence that foreign mercenaries are being brought into Mali.

Meanwhile, in Côte d’Ivoire, a newspaper allied with former president Laurent Gbagbo is also supporting the hypothesis of “mercenaries” sent to Bamako by President Ouattara. Using the mercenary angle allows Ouattara’s opponents at home to undermine his credentials as a peacemaker and statesman, and fits into a longstanding narrative among Gbagbo supporters arguing that Ouattara only succeeded in ousting Gbagbo from power last year with the help of foreign mercenaries. The Ouattara/mercenary hypothesis is now being picked up in the Malian press along with other manifestations of mercenary hysteria. In terms of its credibility, you can file this narrative with the penis-shrinker stories.

On the positive side, however, I can point to two promising signs on the political scene. One, interim President Dioncounda has stated that he won’t exceed the constitutionally mandated 40-day period in office, and has thereby removed one of the major sticking points in the transition process. Two, the junta is still engaging in dialogue with ECOWAS via the government of Burkina Faso, with whom a five-member CNRDRE delegation had talks Wednesday in Ouagadougou, and junta representatives continue to insist that the recent disturbances will not derail Mali’s transitional institutions.

Update, 14:00 GMT, Thursday May 3: Today has been another enforced day off for me since the daycare center is closed until Monday, May 7. The U.S. Embassy here also remains closed and an appointment I had scheduled there for the 7th has already been canceled due to the security situation.

ORTM television has broadcast a statement by Mali’s new minister of internal security, General Tiéfing Konaté. He stutters so badly, it’s hard not to feel sorry for the man; he clearly needs to find a spokesperson, at least for TV appearances. According to Konaté, yesterday’s panic in Bamako was the result of a false alarm. He says investigations have been launched into the origins of the recent incidents between military personnel as well as the deadly police assault on the university campus that occurred Monday afternoon.

Mali’s state-run newspaper L’Essor has published a fairly thorough account of those inter-military confrontations, including a few new details (e.g., no attempt to arrest airborne regiment commander Abidine Guindo preceded Monday’s actions, but a visiting delegation of junta officials was roughed up at the regiment’s Djicoroni base on Monday afternoon). A report on the Ivoirian news website koaci.com alleges that Malian PM Cheikh Modibo Diarra is frustrated by his powerlessness and apparent marginalization at the hands of the CNRDRE junta.

Strange days in Bamako

8:00 a.m. GMT: I thought I heard more shooting, but it was just thunder. A rainstorm blew in about half an hour ago.

Lt. Mohamed Issa Ouedraogo, CNRDRE

ORTM is broadcasting the same kind of folklore recordings it was playing the morning of March 22, but interrupts them occasionally with a communiqué by the CNRDRE junta, read in French by Lt. Mohamed Issa Ouedraogo. He urges Malians to remain calm. He says that an operation, mounted by Malian and foreign individuals of “various horizons” and backed by  “obscure forces inside Mali” to destabilize the country has been defeated and that the CNRDRE remains in control of the situation. Ouedraogo says the army has killed and captured several men involved in this operation.

Images show young troops who appear to be prisoners in handcuffs, wearing camouflage fatigues with no insignia; the broadcast also shows images of weapons (assault rifles, hand grenades, a recoilless rifle) that may have been captured. Lt. Ouedraogo finishes the statement, attributing it to Captain Amadou Haya Sanogo, who has not been seen on television since the unrest began yesterday.

Next, wearing a blue boubou and white cap, appears Dr. Adama Traoré, Vice President of the Coordination des Organisations Patriotiques du Mali (COPAM), a pro-putsch umbrella group formed in the days after last month’s coup d’etat. Flanked by a couple of young men in street clothes, he gives a statement in Bamanan with the same content as Lt. Ouedraogo’s remarks.

An SMS comes from the US Embassy: “Situation remains uncertain. Road blocks reported around Bamako. U.S. citizens advised to remain sheltered in place.”

9:00 a.m. GMT: The rain has subsided, not enough to wash the dust off the bottom-most leaves on the mango trees. So far there’s no information from any sources to contradict the CNRDRE claims of control, though one rumor claims that the junta has been broadcasting its televised message via an ORTM mobile unit and is not actually in control of the ORTM studio. I haven’t yet ventured out to assess the situation in my neighborhood, but everything seems calm. Al Jazeera English is backing up the junta’s position that a “counter-coup” has been successfully repulsed.

10:00 a.m. GMT: Just heard two simultaneous bursts of heavy machine gun fire, coming from two directions — north, near the Pont des Martyrs, and south, near the Pont Fahd. Sporadic bursts of rifle and machine gun fire continue emanating from the north. Not sure if it’s celebratory or actual fighting, but it doesn’t sound like the shooting we heard after the coup in March, which was all firing in the air. There’s a rumor in our neighborhood that foreign troops have been sighted in the city and that the shooting is by Malian forces engaging with these foreigners. I’m highly skeptical of these rumors.

One big question is on my mind: Assuming the junta is back in control, what will last night’s attempted counter-coup mean for Mali’s political transition? During his phone call broadcast on Radio Kayira several hours ago, Captain Sanogo claimed that the country’s interim president, prime minister, cabinet and legislature were all safe and would continue to go about their work. I’m guessing, however, that in light of recent events, many troops loyal to Sanogo will have a serious bone to pick with interim President Dioncounda Traoré, on whom they will likely blame the recent instability and whom they have already accused of selling out the country to ECOWAS for selfish political gain. Rumors are circulating online that ECOWAS troops have entered Mali from the south, via the Sikasso region, and are heading toward Bamako.

Foreign mediation of Mali’s crisis appears to be dead in the water at this point, as anti-foreign rhetoric has ratcheted up. Sanogo alleged on Radio Kayira that foreign mercenaries were involved in the unrest, and warned Malians to be on the lookout for unknown foreigners. I presume by this he means those who might be part of an ECOWAS intervention force. It’s hard to see how the junta and ECOWAS can get back to the negotiating table now, given how much positions on both sides have radicalized.

Unnamed sources cited by Jeune Afrique indicate that interim president Traoré and prime minister Diarra are safe, and apparently not in military custody.

12:00 GMT: More bursts of gunfire audible from the northeast. Since they are few and far between, I’m going to assume that they are from shooting into the air rather than shots fired in anger. RFI is reporting red berets firing in the air in and around Djicoroni. But I’m still staying home today.

Radio Kayira continues to rebroadcast Captain Sanogo’s telephone call from 12 hours ago on its airwaves. I’m unaware of any further contact with the captain since then and he has not yet appeared on television.

12:45 GMT: More shooting coming from the same direction, including the “boom-boom-boom” of heavy weapons. I’m wondering if I should revisit my hypothesis of shooting into the air. But so far media are still reporting that the fighting in Bamako and Kati is over, and that forces loyal to the CNRDRE junta won.

13:30 GMT: Jeune Afrique reports that junta troops have attacked the Djicoroni base that is home to the airborne regiment and presidential guard. A friend speaking on the phone with relatives in Djicoroni could hear the sound of heavy gunfire.

ORTM television continues to air documentary programs, nothing at all about current events, and the ORTM’s two radio frequencies have also been broadcasting identical pre-recorded content. It seems that ORTM staff are not present in the studios, or at least not in sufficient numbers to produce and air live programs.

15:00 GMT: I phone a friend who works in ACI 2000, not far from Djicoroni. He says soldiers have been passing through the neighborhood on their way to attack the paratroopers’ base, and I can hear gunshots on the other end of the phone. There are still sporadic bursts of fire audible from my house in Badalabougou, still emanating from the northeast.

AFP, citing hospital sources in Bamako, says the casualties so far include 14 dead and 40 wounded among military personnel on both sides.

16:00 GMT: Captain Sanogo appears on ORTM television, shown with fellow junta officers in a salon. He describes the current conflict as having been set in motion by “ill-intentioned elements” that had been infiltrating Bamako in recent days. He continues to express his support for the “accord-cadre” signed with ECOWAS a month ago. Sanogo’s brief (2 min. 30 sec.) appearance is followed by a statement by Hamadoun Touré, minister of communication in the new civilian government. Touré urges Malians to remain calm and to strive for a definitive return of constitutional rule as well as a restoration of the Malian state on all Malian territory (including the north).

I continue to hear sporadic shots from the northeast. Reuters reports that the Djicoroni Para base has been overrun by troops loyal to the junta, and that many red berets fled.

22:00 GMT: All quiet, no shots audible for some hours now. It seems the junta troops have reestablished control. I’d heard that soldiers had taken over the city’s two principal bridges over the Niger, but a friend who crossed the Pont Fahd four hours ago told me he saw no soldiers on or near it.

The airport is closed and all commercial flights in and out have been cancelled until 7 May. Royal Air Maroc has suspended all flights to Bamako for the next two weeks.

One of the two students wounded during yesterday’s police raid at the university campus reportedly died in hospital today, bringing the death toll of that operation to two. Something tells me my anthropology class won’t be meeting this week.

Still nothing but canned programming on ORTM radio and TV, and no journal télévisé tonight. I’m also disappointed with Africable, which after airing some preliminary reports of unrest yesterday stopped covering the situation in Bamako altogether, and has since only aired news from other West African countries. The private network did the same thing after the March coup, broadcasting an early interview with Captain Sanogo before suspending local journalism for several days. Junta’s orders, perhaps? The Bamako newspapers were all mum today too, though it could simply be because of the holiday.

The U.S. Embassy in Bamako has announced that it will be closed tomorrow due to “continued unrest.” I am hoping, however, that schools will reopen, as I am very much in favor of letting my children go bug somebody else for a few hours. If the calm persists, I think we have a good chance of that happening. Otherwise, I will be desperate to avoid another day of sheltering in place.

23:00 GMT: For what it’s worth, today has seen by far the most visits to this blog of any day since I started it in September: about 6,000 hits since midnight GMT, twice as many as the previous highest-traffic day (which was April 4, the day I wrote that Peace Corps was pulling its volunteers out). People seem to like it when I blog about bad news or the sound of gunfire. I can’t exactly promise to keep that stuff coming, however. In fact I can’t wait to get back to blogging about mundane bamakois life — higher education, gender relations, the Djakarta, the local martial arts scene…. For months I’ve been knocking around an idea for a post on the dojos of Bamako. But in light of Mali’s recent political trauma, the thought of writing about such things seems in poor taste. I’ll get to them someday, when all this is over and Bamako is again a rather dull place to be.

Here’s wishing you had a happy May Day/International Workers’ Day/Organization of African Unity Day.

23:42 GMT: Damned if there isn’t more shooting breaking out north of the river. But I’m going to bed anyhow.

Gunfire across the Niger, again

6:40 p.m. GMT: For the first time since the coup last month, we hear the sound of shots coming from the north. So far some heavy machine gun fire and booms. The gunfire lasts about two minutes then falls silent.

It’s been a strange day, with a great dust cloud hanging over Bamako since Sunday afternoon. The sky is khaki-colored, and the city has been suffused in an unnatural yellowish light. Flights into Bamako International Airport had to be cancelled due to poor visibility (about 100 meters, according to the state meteorological service).

Politically the situation has been tense since the ECOWAS declarations of last week. The junta is feeling justifiably under threat, and has dispatched troops to the airport to guard against any attempt to land an ECOWAS intervention force by air.

We are hoping that soon the dust will settle, literally and figuratively, and that cool heads will prevail.

7:00 p.m. GMT: An SMS arrives from the embassy’s security officer: ”Gunfire reported throughout Bamako. Red beret [sic] reported to be active. Shelter in place.”

I receive an e-mail via Malilink reading “Violent clash between security forces and Malian students. Dead and wounded are already being reported.” Last week we heard that Hamadoun Traoré, secretary general of Mali’s AEEM student syndicate had narrowly escaped an assassination attempt, and that the AEEM was organizing a student strike today to protest the junta. The AEEM has long been a highly politicized organization with a prominent role on the national political scene. This is the first I’ve heard of it coming out in opposition to the junta. Local news outlets are reporting that earlier today, AEEM members attacked a radio station (Radio Kayira) run by Oumar Mariko, a vocal member of Mali’s anti-globalization left who until recently was also a vocal backer of the junta; they allege that Mariko was using his radio station to incite violence against AEEM leadership. Later in the day, one student was killed and two (including Hamadoun Traoré) wounded  after police launched an assault on the university campus around 4 p.m.

7:10 p.m. GMT: Another embassy SMS: “Gunfire reported in ACI 2000, vicinity of ORTM and possibly other areas of Bamako. US citizens advised to shelter in place.”

We have heard no more shooting for 30 minutes now. If it was a confrontation between troops and protestors, I suspect the demonstration was broken up and that things will remain quiet now that night has fallen. Tomorrow is a holiday (International Workers Day in most of the world, but African Unity Day in Mali) so schools will be out of session and most offices will be closed.

7:50 p.m. GMT: Africable TV reports that the area around the Djicoroni paratrooper base has been cordoned off, and that a military column was seen moving from the base toward downtown. There is some speculation that the “red berets” (members of the airborne regiment, also charged with protecting Mali’s president) are confronting troops loyal to the junta, but nobody really knows yet what’s been happening.

8:00 p.m. GMT: AFP reports that red berets have confronted junta soldiers after the latter tried to arrest a presidential guard commander. It’s probably Abidine Guindo, who helped Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) escape the presidential palace after mutineers surrounded it last month. The clashes between students and security forces appear to be a separate development.

ORTM continues to broadcast, though the AFP report cited above suggests that shooting has taken place close to the ORTM studios. The usual 8 p.m. newscast does not come on, however; instead, a documentary is being aired.

8:15 p.m. GMT: Le Journal du Mali is reporting that red berets have taken over the ORTM compound, in what it describes as an “attempted counter-coup.” Apparently the junta is also going with the counter-coup narrative: CNRDRE spokesman Bakary Mariko told Reuters, “These are elements of the presidential guard from the old regime and they’re trying to turn things around,” adding, “We have the situation under control.”

Despite what Mariko and some journalists are saying, I doubt there are many ATT loyalists left in the parachute regiment or elsewhere in the armed forces. I suspect this evening’s conflict is not about ATT at all, but about who has the power to arrest whom and which soldiers will follow orders from the post-ATT leaders of Mali’s transitional government. No further word about the situation from Africable, and ORTM continues to broadcast its documentary. TM2 is showing “The Bodyguard,” with Kevin Costner and the late Whitney Houston.

10:00 p.m. GMT: AFP reports that gunfire has also been heard in Kati, where members of the junta themselves are under fire, and that the red berets have succeeded in taking over the ORTM (which is still broadcasting entertainment programs). According to Malijet, red berets are in control of one of the bridges over the Niger River, though if there’s been any combat there I certainly would have heard it from my house and so far the night is still quiet. Meanwhile, Xinhua is reporting that the red berets are out to “finish off” Captain Sanogo and his junta, and the AP quotes junta spokesman Bakary Mariko as saying that counter-coup forces are trying to take over the airport so they can fly in ECOWAS supporting troops.

11:00 p.m. GMT: According to AFP there are “several dead” at the ORTM compound, which the CNRDRE says it controls despite numerous claims to the contrary in the media. ORTM is now airing a documentary about Lake Chad. Le Journal du Mali reports that red berets now control both ORTM and the Bamako airport.

11:30 p.m. GMT: Adam Nossiter of The New York Times has been in touch with several CNRDRE officers and reports no consensus among them that a “counter-coup” has been taking place, but all of them are quite concerned about fighting between their men and the red berets. It seems most English-language journalists are describing the red berets as “loyalist troops” or “troops loyal to deposed president Amadou Toumani Touré.” I think it’s highly unlikely, however, that anyone is trying to put ATT back in office, and I doubt even ATT would want his old job back at this point.

11:42 p.m. GMT: I’m hearing heavy gunfire again, for the first time in five hours. It seems to be coming from the northeast, the direction of the Pont des Martyrs and the ORTM compound. It lasts only a minute before the quiet returns.

A banner on Maliweb reads “Latest update: The red berets seem to control the city of Bamako – the ORTM, the airport (two planes just landed – uncertain if these are ECOWAS planes). Many deaths at the ORTM. There is no access to the Kati road. Engine sounds from heavy combat vehicles can be heard at the Kati garrison. The meeting in Ouaga scheduled for today has been canceled. A declaration is awaited on the TV.”

1:00 a.m. GMT: Radio France International, which posted nothing at all about events in Bamako to its website on Monday, finally puts up an item saying the situation here is confused. No kidding.

One commenter on this post says he was at the airport from 6 p.m. until midnight and that, while many shots were fired, the airport appeared still to be in the hands of regular army units, and he wasn’t aware of any planes landing during that period.

Capt. Sanogo phones Radio Kayira (the same radio that AEEM demonstrators tried to storm Monday afternoon) a little past midnight and speaks in Bamanan with the on-air host for about ten minutes. Contradicting every news report issued so far, he denies that there has been any conflict between factions of the Malian army, denies that there has been any fighting in Kati, and claims that the airport and ORTM remain under the control of his men. (The fact that ORTM didn’t broadcast any news tonight was due to technical problems, if we buy this explanation.) Sanogo does allege that unspecified foreigners have been infiltrating the city, and claims that his forces have killed some and captured others. He calls on Malians to come out on Tuesday to oppose foreign forces coming into Bamako. To underscore the seriousness of the moment, Kayira is now playing music by the late Djeli Bazoumana Sissoko, a revered griot whose recordings were broadcast on national radio during coups in 1968 and 1991. (You can hear streaming audio from Radio Kayira here; they have been re-broadcasting Captain Sanogo’s call periodically between Bazoumana recordings.)

ORTM, by the way, continues to broadcast its documentaries, and Africable hasn’t aired anything new on the local situation for five hours.

1:42 a.m. GMT: More gunfire coming from the northeast, lasting less than a minute.

I’m turning in for the night. Tuesday promises to be an interesting day and I plan to spend it at home.

ECOWAS screws the pooch

Last week Mali’s political scene appeared to be moving in the right direction. Prime Minister Diarra’s transitional government was finally named, and the CNRDRE junta in Kati was keeping relatively quiet, having gone several days without arresting anyone. Even the power outages that were daily throughout the first half of April had become rare. Most regular Bamakois I knew — i.e., those not involved in politics — were satisfied that the state could at last get back to dealing with urgent matters, most notably Mali’s de facto partition after separatist rebels last month took over the northern half of the country.

Yes, there was still uncertainty over how the transition would play out after the 40-day interim period mandated by Mali’s 1992 constitution. There was concern over the junta’s lingering presence in state media outlets (which continue to give more attention to CNRDRE head Captain Amadou Sanogo than to interim president Dioncounda Traoré). And there were objections that the new government had been formed without sufficient consultation of Mali’s so-called “forces vives” — a term which, in Bamako these days, is used more and more to refer to representatives of various political parties, as well as to civil society leaders and virtually anyone else who thinks they have something to say about the state of the nation.

Overall, however, efforts by Mali’s new civilian authorities and by the international community to get the government up and running again, without undue interference by the military, seemed to be working. Then, late Thursday, we learned that a summit of West African heads of state in Abidjan, organized by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), had decided to fix the duration of Mali’s transitional president and government at 12 months, and to dispatch at least 3000 soldiers to Mali to “secure the transitional government” and “supervise the transition.” And they threatened targeted sanctions against junta leaders who didn’t abide by ECOWAS decisions.

ECOWAS leaders in Abidjan, April 26, 2012
(See that guy in the white robe? He came to power in a coup! So did the one in the red tie....)

Responses to this declaration from Bamakois have been highly critical. A good many people here see the CNRDRE as having a legitimate role in Mali’s political process, as I wrote a month ago, and they don’t like to see Captain Sanogo and his men threatened. Nobody is keen on having their country’s transition managed by outsiders, especially by foreigners whose own democratic credentials are often dubious at best.

The people and their army say NO... (April 30, Info Matin)

On top of that, Malians wonder how ECOWAS, for all its emphasis on respect for constitutional process, can unilaterally extend the length of the transition beyond the 40 days provided for by Mali’s constitution. 40 days may be too short to achieve very much, but any modification of that period ought to come from within Mali’s political system rather than being imposed from outside.

At the Kati army garrison where the CNRDRE is based, tempers flared. Rowdy troops gathered to jeer at the foreign minister of Burkina Faso, Djibril Bassolé, who had come to represent ECOWAS in talks with junta leaders, and reportedly cocked their weapons to demonstrate their opposition to any compromise. Captain Sanogo, despite the cagey game he’s played to stay in the political picture, has always publicly stated his support for regional mediation of Mali’s crisis, and now it’s unclear whether he can make his men respect any deal brokered with ECOWAS. He has repeatedly rejected any foreign troop deployment in Mali.

Many observers, myself included, have a great deal of respect for the role the Burkinabè, particularly Foreign Minister Bassolé, have played throughout this crisis. Bassolé has demonstrated quiet, effective diplomacy and a knack for heading off conflicts. But the ECOWAS heads of state, with their deadlines and threats, have put him in a difficult position. The risk now is that more Malians (especially those in and around Bamako) will start to perceive the current crisis as pitting Mali’s needs against sinister foreign agendas, as the country’s anti-globalization left has been depicting things all along. Up till now those radical anti-ECOWAS voices have been a tiny fringe, but in light of the heavy-handed tactics recently adopted by ECOWAS, they are growing louder and more numerous by the day, putting further attempts at outside mediation in jeopardy. An anti-ECOWAS rally has already been announced for Thursday.

It’s been said that “diplomacy consists of telling the other guy to go to Hell in such a way that he looks forward to the trip.” Rattling sabers and issuing ultimata may sound great, but it’s ultimately counter-productive in situations like the one Mali faces now. If ECOWAS leaders truly seek a diplomatic solution to Mali’s current political mess, they need to tone down the rhetoric and give Captain Sanogo and his men a face-saving way out.

Lacking that, the progress of the last few weeks will prove to be very short-lived, and Mali’s most pressing goal — reunifying the country — will grow ever more remote.

Hail the newcomers

On Wednesday, after days of delay, the composition of Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra’s government was finally announced. Like the prime minister himself, most of the cabinet ministers selected are outsiders to Bamako’s political scene, and could not be easily associated with Mali’s classe politique. None had served in governments under ousted president Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) over the last decade.

Prime Minister Cheikh Modibo Diarra addressing the nation last week

Observers have already raised a number of objections to Diarra’s cabinet. Some say its key posts have gone to the military, which is true: the ministers of defense, territorial administration, and internal security are all military men. It’s worth noting, however, that the same was true in ATT’s last government, where these same ministries were run by high-ranking army officers. The difference this time is that Mali’s three soldier-ministers are close to the CNRDRE junta. This is especially true of Colonel Moussa Sinko Coulibaly, Minister of Territorial Administration (akin to an interior minister): until yesterday he was junta leader Amadou Sanogo’s chief of staff, and he has already paid a visit to the latter in his Kati headquarters, showing where his first loyalty lies.

Another complaint is that the new government defies the spirit of the transitional agreement signed earlier this month between the junta and the West African regional body ECOWAS. This allegation has been made by both the anti-putsch Front uni pour la défense de la République et de la démocratie (FDR), composed mainly of “old-guard” political parties that had participated in governments under ATT’s rule, and by the formerly pro-putsch Mouvement Populaire du 22 Mars (MP22), composed of some of the most radical critics of ATT’s rule. Their specific objection is that the cabinet is not a “government of national unity” as called for by the transitional accord. What they really mean is that none of their people were chosen for it. MP22′s decision to end its support for the junta in response to the new government’s formation is hardly surprising: the movement’s leader, Oumar Mariko, has been angling for a job in the transitional government since the first days of the coup.

A critique levied by RPM party boss Boubacar Touré, among others, is that the new cabinet shows too much influence from neighboring heads of state, particularly Blaise Compaoré, President of Burkina Faso. The most senior cabinet member, Sadio Lamine Sow, placed in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, has served as a special adviser to Compaoré in Ouagadougou for several years. The new Minister of Communications and Information Technology is Hamadoun Touré, who as spokesman for the United Nations mission in Côte d’Ivoire last year was seen as someone close to Ivoirian President Alassane Dramane Ouattara. Notably, the cabinet includes several “Maliens de l’exterieur” — like the prime minister himself, these are migrants who’ve spent much of their professional lives abroad.

It’s also true that the government lacks women (only three out of 24), and that northerners are under-represented, in contrast to successive ATT cabinets in which northerners in general, and Tuareg in particular, were highly visible.

But let’s look at the positive side. One noteworthy choice is the new justice minister, Malick Coulibaly. He is a former assistant prosecutor whose claim to fame is having resigned his job nearly four years ago in protest of high-level interference in one of his cases. The case was a banal dispute over a cow, but the prosecutor’s resignation was surprising because such gestures of principle have been rare in Mali (where, all too often, resigning from government means unemployment). Coulibaly’s appointment is therefore highly symbolic. Malians have little faith in their judicial system, as I pointed out in a previous post; one elderly man once told me, “Judges in Mali aren’t 100 percent corrupt. They’re 1000 percent corrupt.” The hope is that Coulibaly will be able to clean house.

Like a lot of Malians I’ve heard from since yesterday’s announcement, I’m inclined to see the formation of this new government as an encouraging sign. Yes, the cabinet shows the continuing influence of the junta, but most of its members appear to have been selected based on professional competence rather than party affiliation or partisan loyalty. This, more than anything else, is what upsets the bigwigs of the classe politique, and that’s just fine with ordinary Bamakois. Given prevailing public distrust of Mali’s established political parties, I doubt that protests by either the FDR or the MP22 against the new government will get much traction. The cabinet’s infusion of “new blood,” on the other hand, has been widely hailed in Bamako as a very good thing. Being a political unknown is an asset these days.

We should be wary, however, of the strong emphasis during this transitional process on the personal integrity of public officials. The way people around here tend to describe things, previous governments were venal and corrupt because the ministers named to them were immoral individuals who never received proper upbringing. Not enough Malians appreciate the extent to which bad governance stems from institutional rather than individual factors. Personal integrity is well and good, but in the absence of effective institutional controls, even upstanding individuals can achieve little in the fight against corruption.

In short, as a New Orleans prosecutor once said, “Corruption is not about greed, and it’s not about need; it’s about opportunity.” As long as public officials have the opportunity to abuse the public trust, with little fear of being caught or punished, they will do so — especially in a social context where high status comes with powerful obligations to reward one’s kin and supporters and to “share the wealth.”

Mali’s new government should be hailed as an important step forward, but it will need to build a climate where the rule of law prevails alongside respect for the state and its institutions. That battle is at least as important as the battle to reunify the country and regain the north, and in the long run Mali can’t succeed without winning it.

Life goes on amid crisis

It’s the hot season in Bamako. How hot is it? When you turn on the cold water tap, you get hot water. That’s how hot it is.

Power outages are still a daily occurrence in town, but for the last week or so they’ve been growing shorter — lasting anywhere from two to eight hours daily, instead of ten or eleven, and almost exclusively during the daytime.

As always at this time of year, along the Niger River, flamboyant trees (Delonix regia, an exotic species native to Madagascar but now found throughout the tropics) are in full boom, their orange-red flowers bright against the hazy hot-season sky.

Flamboyants on the Niger's left bank

Deposed president Amadou Toumani Touré got on a plane last Friday and flew into exile in Senegal, but only after reportedly being accosted and threatened by troops loyal to the CNRDRE junta that ousted him from power. According to an account in the local press, shots were even fired on the airport tarmac as he was getting ready to board his plane, resulting in a disorderly and disgraceful exit for the man who had been Mali’s head of state since 2002 until last month. There was a similar dust-up over the weekend when Soumaila Cissé, injured while trying to escape arrest last week, wanted to fly to France for medical treatment. Ultimately he was allowed to board his plane, but only after the intervention of high-level foreign diplomats.

From Turkey, ORTM's latest TV soap acquisition, "Noor"

On ORTM, the state television service, the Turkish soap opera “Noor” has replaced the Telemundo telenovela “Frijolito” on weekday afternoons. Many Bamakoises never got to see the ending of “Frijolito” due to power outages. This was a source of much regret for the women in my household.

Apparently the junta continues to exercise some degree of control over the content of state media. Inside the ORTM compound, amid the usual bustle of employees and visitors, dozens of soldiers lounge in small groups. A twin-barreled anti-aircraft gun sits in the back of the courtyard, facing the entrance. It is ideally positioned to take out any nearby threat, such as the Hotel de l’Amitié. If you’re checking in there, I’d avoid getting a room on the upper floors.

(What is it about putschistes and anti-aircraft artillery? As the BBC’s Mark Doyle noted in Guinea a few years back, warfare in Africa almost never involves shooting down enemy planes; yet as soon as a crisis occurs, the army breaks out the triple-A.)

Those familiar with Bamako know that there are many exotic flavors of soft drinks to be found here. As of this month there are two new flavors on the Malian soft drink market. D’jino has a pear-flavored soda, which is not bad, and Youki has introduced ginger soda. Unfortunately I haven’t yet been able to sample the latter as it has not yet been distributed to our neighborhood beverage retailers.

Just when you thought it was safe for old-guard politicians to go out in public again, we’ve gotten word of new arrests by the junta of people in interim president Dioncounda Traoré’s entourage. Which brings us back to the question, Who’s really in charge around here? If it’s the civilian transitional government, why does the army keep detaining political figures connected to it? A CNRDRE representative recently told the Voice of America that the junta exercises no political power and answers solely to civilian officials, but that claim rings about as hollow as last week’s allegations of a sinister plot against the Malian people. At least there was one positive sign in junta-civilian relations this week: CNRDRE head Captain Amadou Sanogo called on President Traoré at the presidential palace, marking the first time he’s visited Mali’s civilian leaders. Up to this point, they’ve always had to drive to Kati to see him. But the presidential palace still hasn’t recovered from the damage and looting that took place last month.

Bamako received its first rainfall in six months last Friday morning, temporarily reducing the hot spell. The rain, however, came around the same time as a deadly accident on the Pont des Martyrs that took the lives of three U.S. military advisers and three Moroccan civilians.

For the rest of us, even in the face of continuing uncertainty and stifling heat, life goes on.

Catch and release

Just a few days ago, many observers outside Mali believed that the CNRDRE junta responsible for ousting President Amadou Toumani Touré (ATT) last month had departed the political scene, having handed control of the state to a civilian government. Events of this past week have shown not only that the junta wants to continue wielding power on Mali’s political scene, but that its leaders are skilled political tacticians.

The wave of arrests that shook Bamako’s classe politique between 16 and 18 April cast a wide net. As of this Friday morning those detained have all reportedly been freed, but it’s worth asking what this episode reveals about the junta. I’ll divide the individuals targeted into four categories:

1. Prominent members of the anti-junta Front du Refus (FDR), like Kassoum Tapo and Tieman Coulibaly, who pose the most immediate political challenge to the junta;
2. High-ranking figures in the pre-coup state security apparatus, a category composing half of all those detained, such as the former defense minister Sadio Gassama and head of national police Mahamadou Djagouraga;
3. Former top officials in ATT’s deposed regime, such as ex-prime minister Modibo Sidibé, ex-chief of staff Hamidou Sissoko, and ex-adviser Bani Kanté, who rightly or wrongly with ATT receive much of the blame for the problems currently afflicting the Malian state; and finally,
4. A residual category of individuals I can’t place in any of the above three categories; these include prominent presidential candidate Soumaila Cissé and a banker named Babaly Ba. While Cissé had no connection to ATT’s government, Ba was reputed to be close to certain members of ATT’s entourage.

I spent much of the last few days puzzling over what this list of detainees signified, and what if anything the individuals arrested have in common. The CNRDRE has issued vague statements that the detainees were hatching a sinister plot, but these statements cannot be considered credible. Nothing links all these individuals together, and it defies belief that these heterogeneous elements could form a cabal… though some of them could conceivably be in league with each other.

Was the junta trying to assure its leaders’ own security by simultaneously targeting its most vocal political opponents (category 1) and top defense and police officials (category 2)? Maybe. On this score it’s noteworthy that since the coup, CNRDRE head Captain Amadou Sanogo has rarely left his headquarters in Kati’s Soundiata Keita army base. He clearly believes his power, and perhaps his life, are threatened. This week top officials in the civilian government went to see him, not the other way around.

The junta might also have been hoping to score political points with ordinary Malians, and especially Bamakois, by going after some of the people most closely associated with the unpopular ATT regime (category 3). These days it’s hard to find people in Bamako who won’t tell you that the political apparatus under ATT was corrupt to the core, or who express sympathy for all those big-shots who have now been humbled. Pro-junta journalists love to speculate about all the sins those arrested might have committed both before and since the coup.

But it’s the combination of all four categories that suggests another purpose to the junta’s crackdown this week, and I suspect I know what that purpose was.

Cheick Modibo Diarra: Politics is not rocket science (it's much harder)

The arrests began, not coincidentally, at the same moment that Mali’s transitional prime minister was named. Dr. Cheick Modibo Diarra (CMD) is a political outsider but a familiar name here: a physicist by training, he gained fame working on NASA’s Mars Pathfinder mission in the 1990s, then headed Microsoft’s operations in Africa before becoming a candidate for the presidential elections that had been expected later this month. He is now officially in charge of forming a cabinet, organizing elections and reunifying his secession-split country — not necessarily in that order.

Behind the scenes, the CNRDRE has been maneuvering to claim key ministries in CMD’s new government. The haggling over which ministerial portfolios would go to which parties and factions was intense, and lacking outside political support the junta had little leverage in these negotiations.  After the wave of arrests occurred, however, junta leaders had valuable bargaining chips in their possession, notably key figures of two of Mali’s largest and most powerful political parties — ADEMA (Kassoum Tapo) and the URD (Soumaila Cissé). Their being in military custody sent a chill through Bamako’s entire political class, with the heads of all major parties suddenly fearing for their own safety. It seems likely the junta only agreed to set its detainees free in exchange for increased influence in the new government. This would explain the odd mixture of people arrested — a diverse political portfolio — as well as the fact that the military released all of them without a protest, despite having (indirectly) accused them of treasonous activities.

What lesson can we learn from this week’s events? Don’t underestimate the CNRDRE leaders, who have shown more political cunning than many of us initially gave them credit for. They know how to use power to achieve their aims without overplaying their hand. In light of the junta’s keen survival instincts, it will prove difficult to isolate, marginalize or weaken Sanogo and his followers in the weeks to come.

Footnote: My analysis in the last two paragraphs above hinges on the reporting of the Bamako-based daily L’Indépendant which, aside from being one of Mali’s most respectable newspapers, correctly predicted Cheick Modibo Diarra’s nomination as prime minister. But it can still get things spectacularly wrong, as when it reported last week that Cheick Modibo Diarra had persuaded the U.S. to send Apache helicopters to help the Malian government combat the rebellion in the north.